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Abstract
In the present paper we examine whether investment decisions
and financial decisions can be separated. Our assumption is
that if the amount of debt cannot cause any change of share-
holder’s value, then the two kinds of decisions can be separated.
But the effect of borrowing money is so arborescent, that the
specifics could only be cached, represented in the Capital As-
set Pricing Model’s (CAPM) word. With our novel approach
we would also like to show a simple and widely useable tutorial
method.
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1 Introduction
In corporate economic analyses it is assumed that the financial
and the investment decisions are independent (from each other).
Mostly it is an inartificial assumption, because there is no ar-
gument allying a specific source of money to a definite project.
Accordingly, decision makers think about which investment to
realize, and then how to finance it.
In this article we examine the changes of shareholder value
when the capital structure is reconditioned. We indicate only
three kinds of source: equities, debts and bank loans. Moreover,
in the long run bank loans and debt make no difference, and we
reduce only two kinds of source: equities and debts. In our dis-
cussion we examine the changes of expected return and risk of
equities and debts besides the value of the whole company, al-
though the keyquestion is the contingent change of shareholder
value.
We note, usually corporates can change their capital structure
easily. If they pay dividends or by their own equities, they de-
crease the amount of shareholders’ equity, and when they issue
new equities they increase it. The change of the amount of debt
is even easier: they can issue bonds, or pay back their liabilities.
2 Tax Saving
In order to understand the possible value-changing effect of
capital leverage, we need to adjust our mini-firm concept. For
this reason we distinguish between mini-firms before and after
corporate taxes. The cash-flow of mini-firm before taxation can
be divided among shareholders, creditors and the government,
while the one after taxation can only be divided between share-
holders and creditors.
We used VBT to mark the value of a mini-firm before taxes,
which is broken down to shareholder capital (E), total credi-
tor capital1 (D) and total corporate taxes (TcE ). When marking
1 We refer to the British-American economic model, where share and bond
issues play dominant role, and credits have some importance rather in the short-
term availability of resources (which we do not discuss this time). Anyway, we
use the term ”credit” as a “common category”, because sourcing through a
bond issue is so rare in Hungary that the use of this category would be rather
confusing. (There is not too much difference between them anyway: both rep-
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taxes we use “E” together with “c” (marking “corporate”) to
highlight that on the corporate level interest income (i.e. income
of “D”) is not taxable, but only shareholders’ income (“E”) is.
TcE is to be considered as if the government also had some share
in the business of mini-firm – actually this is the real situation –
and we specify the value of this share by that mark. It follows
from the above that E and Dare considered after corporate taxes
but before personal income taxes.
VBT = E + D + TcE = V + TcE
V = E + D (1)
It is worth stressing that the growth of share prices (which we
consider as the main target) is quite different from the increase of
E, since E is the total value of corporate shares. This obviously
changes if E is „replaced” with D, but this will not change a
share price (P) by any means.
We know that
TcE = (E + TcE )tcE
TcE = tcE E + tcETcE
(1− tcE )TcE = tcE E
TcE = tcE1−tcE E
(2)
Since we can express TcE by means of E and tcE tax rate, we
will be able to express VBT as a function of E , D and tcE :
VBT = E + D + TcE
VBT = E + D + tcE1−tcE E
(3)
Consider now VBT as a constant independent from D/E ratio.
If we increase D/E ratio in this case (i.e. replace some dE with
the same value of dD), TcE will obviously decrease, thus we
can save tax. If we stand by the assumption of perfect credit
markets, then the „excess value” coming from the fall of TcE
will obviously be transferred to shareholders – in accordance
with the value conservation law.
We can thus assume that creditors will not account for the
interests received (as expenses), therefore shareholders can keep
the tax saved through credits.
VBT = const. = (E − dE)+ (D + dD)+(
tcE
1− tcE E −
tcE
1− tcE dE
)
+
{
tcE
1− tcE dE
}
(4)
The tag in braces used in the formula shows the increased rate
of the shares „kept” (E-dE).
(Again it can be confusing that the increase of shares’ value
can be associated with two things. First, one can think of the
growth of share-ratio, which naturally decreases with the in-
crease of D/E ratio. On the other hand, one can associate the
specific P value of each share as securities. The current formula
expresses that the increase of D/E ratio (i.e. the fall of E) will
result in the increase of P .)
It is thus clear that leaving the value of mini-firm before taxes
intact, the increase of D/E ratio will decrease TcE and E .
resent a simple crediting relation). However in the selection of marks we fol-
Fig. 1. With increasing of capital leverage the value of a mini-firm before
taxes will not change, while the one after taxes will increase, and all this growth
will benefit the shareholders.
We can see now that the results of the increase of capital lever-
age can be experienced, first through the fact that the value of a
mini-firm before taxes will not change while the one after taxes
will increase, and all this growth will benefit the shareholders.
3 The Decrease of Mini-firm Value before Taxes
through the Increase of D/E
The business efficiency of a company does not depend on the
structure of the operation sources, since the business activity it-
self (sales, costs, etc.) has in most cases “nothing to do” with the
type of sources (shareholders’, or credited money) from which
operative devices are purchased.
In case of higher capital leverage, the companies are pushed
harder due to the continuous interest payments and installments.
As interest payments and installments are prescheduled while
corporate business fluctuates and includes risks, liquidity and fi-
nancial difficulties become more probable and frequent in case
of higher capital leverage. The question is how these may in-
fluence the “normal” way of corporate business operation, and
cause the profitability and efficiency to deteriorate.
The literature cites a number of typical effects of falling busi-
ness efficiency due to the increase of capital leverage:
• Most typical forms of losses on the sales revenue side due to
higher capital leverages may be cases when experiencing the
growing dangers of the company’s liquidity problem - buyers
start to strive for greater safety at the expense of the company.
Buyers therefore can require higher guarantees or may simply
reduce their business relation with the company and look for
another partner.
• A similar cost-side effect is when suppliers demand more se-
curities or shorter payment deadlines due to the danger they
see in the company’s financial problems. Another typical
cost-side loss may be the employees’ claim for a wage com-
pensation whenever they experience a higher than normal risk
of losing their jobs due to financial problems of the company.
lowed the British-American literature: “E” (Equity) and “D” (Debt), using E
for shares and D for credits.
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• Managers of companies who are in debt might also prefer
investment options that are profitable on short-term (quick-
return investments, sales revenue through price-discounts,
etc.), which may have negative effects on or even deteriorate
the corporate value in the long run. Such decisions are also
motivated by the managers’ fear of losing their jobs. Accord-
ing to Fama andMiller (1972) [5] as well as Jensen andMeck-
ling (1976)[13] due to the increasing capital leverage share-
holders are prone to make decisions that reduce the creditor-
value at the expense of shareholder value, while the total cor-
porate value decreases in the meantime. Myers (1977)[16]
states that higher capital leverage may finally result in the
omission of investments since a larger part of the income of
investment is transferred to current creditors.
• Long-term value creating investments may be pushed into the
background, R&D activities typically slow down, the com-
pany’s innovation force diminishes, etc.
We also need to mention the involvement of total risk on cor-
porate investment decisions. As known, in the assessment of
corporate investments (NPV analysis) it is only the market risk
of the investment that is relevant, as specific (diversifiable) risk
is eliminated in the shareholders’ portfolio. We can thus state
that any involvement of total risk in corporate decisions will pre-
sumably spoil decisions from the direction of maximizing share-
holder value.
The appearance of total risk as decision criteria must be
countered for because managers (employees) of companies with
higher capital leverage are afraid of losing their jobs. This time
they prefer projects of lower risk, because they prevent the com-
pany from getting into trouble in the short term, consequently
avoiding losing their job. This phenomenon is usually one of he
so-called agency costs.
According to the research by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet
(1980) [2], short-term credits are used where client costs are
higher.
In accordance with the statements of Jensen (1986) [12], the
increase in capital leverage motivates management to waste less
money on bad investments, as costs of interest payments keep
the company under continuous pressure. Easterbrook (1984) [3]
had similar findings.
Jensen (1986) [12] determined – just opposite to above – ef-
fects may also occur in relation to the total risk. If managers
or even shareholders start to believe that the company will get
into severe financial trouble rather than avoid it, they may prefer
larger investments of total risk. This time they feel that the only
way out is to make a “big deal”, which is prone to risk.
A similar attitude is reflected when shareholders or managers
keep the situation hopeless and do not feel that corporate equity
needs to grow. This time they miss opportunities having positive
NPV.
The change of capital structure can be a warning. In accor-
dance to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) [18] hierarchy study, if a
company is prone to apply for credit, then issues shares, it means
that company management may think that shares are currently
underpriced, so they do not want to issue new shares [17] Due
to asymmetrical information companies prefer internal financ-
ing solutions. Such a situation can arise e.g. after a successful
R&D program, when internal forecasts promise high income,
which managers or shareholders believe in, but the market has
not incorporated into prices yet. In such situations, managers
turn to operative cash-flows rather than credits.
On the other hand, if managers or shareholders feel that the
company is over assessed, then they rather try to issue new
shares.
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961) [11] dividend
payment decision can include information about the corporate
value. It is interesting that these considerations prefer the em-
ployment of a lower credit. Credit agreements often include
terms that forbid further employment of credits when a certain
capital leverage limit is reached. However, managers do not
want to approach this level, because they believe they can lose
their flexibility in financing, and should they find a good project,
they will be forced to finance it through the issue of new shares,
and share the success with “new shareholders”.
We would like to stress, that such significant effects can only
be accounted for at capital markets of lower efficiency.
The growths of controlling or agency costs are usually sig-
nificant in relation to financial difficulties. This is reasonable,
since shareholders – creditors – managers (and somehow gov-
ernment through taxation) conflicts intensify in such cases. Due
to this, both shareholders, and creditors want to keep their eyes
on what is happening with the company, what naturally results
in the increase of costs.
We would like to mention the loss of value between share-
holders and creditors. We can generally state that the majority
of such losses is coped with by shareholders. Mainly due to
the fact that lighter corporate losses do not endanger payment
of credits at all. On the other hand, creditors can reasonably be
easily protected against such losses, since there are a number of
securities that can be incorporated into credit contracts even for
the case of a possible bankruptcy.
In case of liquidation the extra loss of shareholders is nearly
regular. This time shareholders trail to the end of pay-off or-
ders. The procedure results in the depreciation or deterioration
of devices, and lawyer costs and court fees consume the major-
ity of corporate values. Due to the above, it is quite rare that a
shareholder can receive anything.
To summarize, we can state that the efficiency of corporate
(mini-firm) business activity before taxes normally declines with
the increase of capital leverage, i.e. the value of mini-firm before
taxes decreases.
It is clear, that the effects of increases in capital leverage (i.e.
financing) can be simplified to two effects: the increase of cap-
ital leverage results in the growth of mini-firm after taxes, but
that of the mini-firm before taxes decreases. In accordance with
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Fig. 2. With the increase of leverage the value of mini-firm before taxes
decreases
the assumptions, none of the effects concerns the credits; it in-
fluences shareholders (and naturally taxes) only.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) [19] measured among others the
leverage in the US countries from 1987 to 1991. In their find-
ings the leverage is – on average – 28%. Graham (2000) mea-
sured the debt tax advantages of firms from 1980 to 1994 [6].
Graham estimates that the capitalized tax benefit of debt (tcD)
after corporate taxes (D/V=0,28 and tc=47%) equals to 9,7% of
the firm value or 4,3%, net of personal taxes. Kemsley and Nis-
sim (2002) found the same results with an alternative method
[8]. They focus on the data from 1963 to 1993 and investi-
gate 2964 firms’ 42505 events. Their estimated value for the
debt tax shield is 10% of firm value, net of personal disadvan-
tages of debt. These results support the earlier findings of Ma-
sulis (1980) [15] and Engel et al (1999)[4] and the estimates of
MacKie-Mason (1990) [14], Trezevant (1992)[20] and Graham
(1996) [6]. Graham (2000)[7] noted, that the 4,3% could be
overestimated because of some simulation factor (e.g. agency
costs).
Turning to the costs of financial distresses Andrade and Ka-
plan (1998) [1] analysed highly levered companies which were
in financial but not economic distress. They found that the op-
erating efficiency performance declined with 17% - which they
identify the indirect costs of financial distresses – meanwhile
the leverage on average increased from 21% to 91%. Amending
this with the estimated 3% direct costs of financial distresses by
Weiss (1990) [21], the value of the firm declines 20%.
Summing up the empirical data, we can assume that both ef-
fects are of the same significance, so they neutralize each other.
V |D/E  const.
E |D/E  const.
(5)
However, the only thing that stays is the value-neutral capital
leverage, i.e. we can ignore financing issues.
Fig. 3. With the increase of capital leverage the value of mini-firm before
taxes decreases while the one after taxes will increase. The two effects roughly
neutralize each other.
4 Leverage
Now let’s see the mini-firm’s risk and return. First, we have
to highlight that this is a totally another kind of nexus than the
above-mentioned ones.
V = E + D (6)
Based on the value additivity principle the project’s value after
corporate taxes comes from the sum of E and D. With risks
and returns the situation is not the same: the business activity’s
expected return and risk comes form E and D’s risk and return
weighted average:
βV = EE + DβE +
D
E + DβD (7)
E(rV ) = EE + D E(rE )+
D
E + D E(rD) (8)
where E(rE ) is the expected return of equities, E(rD) is the
expected return of debts, E(rV ) is the expected return of the
corporate activities, and βE is the risk of equities, βD is the risk
of debts, and βV is the risk of business activity.
We emphasize that the formulas above are based on the equi-
librium called Persistence of Risk and Returns Principle. The
business activity (the corporate) can be characterized by a cer-
tain expected return and risk. If we disjoin it to E and D, the
expected return and the risk of could be disjointed, too.
4.0.1 The risk and return of debt as a function of leverage
Our discussion is based on assuming perfect debt markets. On
account of this the expected return of the debt is adjusted by its
risk. It is important to understand, on debt markets everybody
is a competitor who wants to borrow: not only companies, but
also (local) governments, financial institutions, persons from all
over the world.
Relying upon the above the risk of debts must be zero when
D/E is low, because there is enough asset and legal warranty
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behind the payback of the principal and interests. By increasing
leverage debts will be growingly risky. Assuming creditors are
holding efficient portfolios the risk of debts can be characterized
by their betas. The higher the leverage, the higher the slope of
the curve.
Fig. 4. Characteristic curve of risky debt.
Now let’s examine the risk and return of debts. Remember, in
a perfect world the return of debt is equal with interest of debt.
ȕ
ȕ
V
D/E10
ȕ
D
Kockázat-
mentes hitel
Kockázatos 
hitel
Riskless
debt
Risky
debt
Fig. 5. Risk (beta) curve of debt as a function of leverage.
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Fig. 6. Expected return of debt as a function of leverage.
At the beginning risk of debt is zero, so the expected return
will be the riskfree interest rate. By increasing leverage the risk
and return of debt begin to rise, because of the chance of default.
At last the increment declines, because creditors begin to absorb
the whole risk of the company.
4.1 The Risk and Expected Return of Equities as a Func-
tion of Leverage
Now let’s deduce the most important formulas concerning to
the shareholders:
βV = EE + DβE +
D
E + DβD (9)
βE = βV + DE (βV − βD) (10)
E(rV ) = EE + D E(rE )+
D
E + D E(rD) (11)
E(rE ) = E(rV )+ DE (E(rV )− E(rD)) (12)
The formulas above show that the risk and expected return of
equities are continuously increasing as a function of D/E . This
phenomenon is called financial leverage.
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Fig. 7. The risks of business activity, debt and equity.
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Fig. 8. The expected values of business activity, debt and equity.
5 Conclusion
We examined three significant effects:
• We demonstrated that by subservient debt taxation debt fi-
nancing causes tax saving, which is gained by the sharehold-
ers. As a consequence, the price of the shares increases with
leverage.
• With the increase of leverage such procedures come into play
(e.g. agency problems) that the value of the mini-firm before
taxes begins to decrease and so does the price of the shares.
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From the aspect of the shareholders, the two effects roughly neu-
tralize each other. Accordingly, leverage causes no change in
shareholder’s value.
• With the increase of leverage βE and E(rE ) is also increas-
ing.
See what happens in connection to leverage in the CAPM be-
low. Without financial distresses and tax savings the following
would happen (index 0,1 and 0,8 mean the ratio of D/E), so we
can follow the increment of leverage:
Fig. 9. Leverage in the CAPM.
(The increase of rD is because the debt becomes risky, rE
because of financial leverage.)
If we consider financial distresses:
Fig. 10. Declining value because of financial distresses.
Remember, the security market line gives situations where
there is equilibrium, if a security diverges from it, it shows value
changing. If the security moves on the security market line, its
value will not change, because it stays in equilibrium (its risk
and return changed in balance). Indeed, securities cannot di-
verge from the security market line, because its value changes
immediately and it is forced back to the line. Now let’s look at
the effect of tax savings (without financial distresses):
Now, the effects of the two phenomena roughly neutralize
each other. We cannot see significant change in value, but the
balanced increase of risk and expected return of equity could be
certainly observed:
About financing decision we can declare that the effects in-
creasing the shareholder value – even by gentle market im-
Fig. 11. Increasing value because of tax savings.
Fig. 12. Aggregate effects of financing in the CAPM.
perfection (taxation biases, agency problems) – are evanes-
cent, to be more precise the aggregate of these effects con-
nected financing decisions becomes particularly moderate, neg-
ligible. On account of this investment decisions generally can
be separated from investment decisions (so as dividend deci-
sions). This is one of the fundamental approaches of corpo-
rate finance: considering investment decisions we assume that
the project (mini-firm) is financed by pure equity. These results
meet with Modigliani and Millers propositions (Modigliani and
Miller (1958, 1969)[9, 10]).
We note that these approaches are valid only when debts can
be obtained on market interest rate predicted by CAPM. In case
of lower (preferential debts) or higher (e.g. temporarily re-
stricted amount of debt) interests, we follow the above men-
tioned methods, but we have to amend the NPV calculation. We
discount the cash-flow of the debt with the market interest pre-
dicted by CAPM, then we complete the “basic NPV” with this
calculation:
N PV = N PVbasic + N PVdebt (13)
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